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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ,

CaseNo.20040633-SC

Defendant/Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW
Under review is State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.3d 291 {Addendum A). In
addition to the facts and argument contained in the Brief of Petitioner [Pet. Br.], the State
submits the following in reply to defendant's Brief of Respondent [Resp. Br.].
REPLY TO POINT I OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
CONTRARYTO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS, PRIOR TO VALDEZ,
UTAH FOLLOWED THE UNIVERSAL RULE THAT A BATSON
OBJECTION MUST BE RAISED DURING THE JURY SELECTION
PROCESS
Defendant does not dispute that he is required to timely raise a Batson obj ection.' See
Resp. Br. at 12. He claims, however, that his Batson objection was timely because it was
raised "following jury selection," but before the trial evidence was presented. See Resp. Br.

1

Batson v. Kentucky, 416 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting racial discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory strikes). "Batson" is used generically and includes allegations of
gender-discrimination raised pursuant to J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).

at 6 & 16. See also Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, Iflf 7-11 (holding that Utah rule permits a
Batson objection up until the trial evidence is presented, even if the jury has been sworn and
the remainder of the venire dismissed). Defendant's characterization of his objection
minimizes its actual circumstances.
Defendant did not merely raise his Batson objection "following jury selection."
During jury selection, defense counsel "noticed . . . that the State struck all women," but he
did not object when the peremptory strikes were made, the selected jurors were sworn, or the
stricken jurors and remainder of the venire were excused (R209: 70 & 78). He remained
silent when the trial jurors were instructed and excused for lunch (R209: 70-76). Only after
discussing jury instructions and other matters, did defense counsel finally raise his Batson
objection as the court was ready to recess for lunch (R209: 70 & 76-78). The prosecutor
immediately responded that the objection was untimely: "We've seated the jury, sworn the
jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that point" (R209: 78). See Pet Br.
at 3-5.
The timing of defendant's Batson objection is significant. Until Valdez, 2004 UT
App 214, ^ 7-11, no jurisdiction—including Utah—viewed a Batson objection as timely if
raised after the trial jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire was excused. See Salt
Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653,655-56 (Utah App. 1989) and cases citedinPet Br.
at 11-21.
Nevertheless, Valdez held and defendant now claims that rule 18, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, "as interpreted by" State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991),
2

permits a Batson objection to be raised after jury selection is completed and the venire is
excused so long as no trial evidence has been presented.2 See Resp. Br. at 13-21. See also
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, Tflf 9-11. Defendant concedes, however, that but for Valdez,
Harrison is the only case to apply rule 18 to a Batson objection. See Resp. Br. at 14.
Despite this dearth of authority, defendant contends that "[i]n Utah, the firmly-established
and regularly-followed rule for determining the timeliness of a Batson objection is rule 18."
Resp. Br. at 13.
Defendant over reads Harrison. In Harrison, the court of appeals, sua sponte and
without the benefit of briefing, summarily held that rule 18's good cause provision permitted
consideration of a Batson objection raised after the jury was sworn, but before the venire was
dismissed.3 See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. See also Pet. Br. at 19-20.
By relying exclusively on Harrison's "interpretation" of rule 18, Valdez and
defendant minimize other substantial authority which aligns with the requirement that

2

Rule 18(c)(2) reads:
A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn
to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented.
See Pet. Br. at 19-20 for discussion of rule 18fs inapplicability to a Batson objection.
3

Defendant claims two other Utah cases considered Batson objections "raised until
after [the] jury [was] sworn." See Resp. Br. at 14 (citing State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App
363, 58 P.2d 867, and State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, 41 P.2d 1153). This is
incorrect. In Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, \ 3, the Batson objection was made during
"the exercise of peremptory challenges," but the merits were addressed after the "normal
process of jury selection was completed." Similarly, in Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, f 3,
the Batson objection was raised "during the jury selection."
3

objections to the composition of the jury must be raised before jury selection is completed.
See Resp. Br. at 14-15. Indeed, contrary to defendant's assertion, the Utah Court of Appeals
directly addressed the appropriate time limit for a Batson objection in Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, two years prior to Harrison. Carlston recognized that courts universally require
a Batson objection to be raised prior to the jury being sworn and the venire excused. 776
P.2dat655-56. See also Gov't of Virgin Islandsv. Forte, 806 F.2d 73,75-76 (3rd Cir. 1986)
(holding a Batson obj ection untimely that was raised after the jury selection process); United
States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656,667 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding a Batson objection untimely that
was raised before the jury was sworn, but after the venire was released); Gavin v. State, 891
So.2d 907, 948 (Ala. App. 2003) (citing line of Alabama cases which require a Batson
objection to be raised before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed); Mooney v. State,
105 P.3d 149,152-53 (Alaska App. 2005) (discussing the "overwhelming majority" rule that
a Batson objection must be raised before to the jury is sworn and venire dismissed and
adopting the same rule in Alaska); Barrow v. State, 605 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Ga. App. 2004)
(concluding that a Batson objection is untimely if raised "after the jury has been impaneled
and sworn"); Casiano v. Greenway Enterprises, Inc., Al P.3d 432, 436 (Mont. 2002)
(affirming that to be timely, a Batson objection must be raised "prior to the impanelment of
the jury and the dismissal of the venire"); State v. Jones, 581 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Wis. App.
1998) (holding that "a defendant must make & Batson objection prior to the time the jury is
sworn" or the claim is waived). After approving of the sound policy supporting this

4

universal requirement, Carlston applied the rule to bar consideration of a post- verdict Bats on
objection.4 776 P.2d at 655-56.
Carlston also cited to the 1987 version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (West 2004),
as another example of a provision which requires an objection to the jury to be "lodged
before the jury [is] sworn."5 776 P.2d at 656 n.5. The State likewise cited section 78-46-16
as consistent with the requirement that aBatson objection be raised during the jury selection
process, but cautioned that "[s]ection 78-46-16 does not govern constitutionally-based
challenges, such as Batson." Pet. Br. at 18 (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,574 n. 115
(Utah 1987)). Nevertheless, defendant erroneously states "the State claims that [section] 7846-16(1), rather than rule 18, is controlling." Resp. Br. at 18 (citing Pet. Br. at 18).
Defendant similarly asserts that "the State concedes that the court of appeals was
bound to follow Utah's 'procedural practice' when deciding the timeliness of Valdez's
objection[, but] complains . . . that no other jurisdictions allow Batson objections 'after the
trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire excused.'" Resp. Br. at 17. This implies
that the State admits rule 18 controls a Batson objection, but "complains" the rule should
not be applied here. Again, this is not the State's position. Rule 18 does not apply to Batson
objections. See Pet. Br. at 19-20.

4

The State incorrectly stated in its opening brief that Harrison did not
acknowledge Carlston. See Pet. Br. at 20. It minimally did. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at
776.
5

See Pet. Br., Add. Cfor copy of 2004 statute, which is substantively unchanged
from the 1987 version..
5

Defendant claims that "other jurisdictions can and do allow Batson objections after
the jury is sworn" and cites Lewis v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E,.2d 492 (Va. App. 1997). See
Resp. Br. at 17. Defendant represents that Lewis held that a Virginia rule "'allows a Batson
motion to be made after the jury is sworn, but only with leave of the court.'" Id. (quoting
Lewis, 492 S.E.2d at 493). While the quote is technically correct, defendant ignores Lewis'
actual holding. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that even though a Virginia rule
permitted a Batson objection to be raised after the jury was sworn, sound policy required that
the objection also be made prior to the venire being excused. Lewis, 492 S.E.2d. at 748-751.
The court explained that if & Batson objection was permitted after the venire was dismissed
and a violation subsequently found, mistrial would be the only available remedy. Id. at 751.
Use of this drastic remedy was contrary to Batson's expectation that a wrongfully struck
juror would be reinstated and also contrary to "the public policy Batson seeks to advance
[and] the fair administration of justice." Id. at 751-52. Consequently, the court refused to
consider the merits of the Batson objection, raised after the jury was sworn and after the
venire was excused. Id. at 747 & 752.
Lewis is consistent with the universal recognition that there is "simply no
justification" for raising a Batson objection after the jury is sworn and venire is dismissed:
If defense counsel does wait until the venire panel is discharged and the
challenge is sustained, then the jury selection process must start anew, and an
additional venire panel must be called. This simply delays justice, and, in
those jurisdictions where an additional venire is not readily available, the delay
can be substantial.

6

State v. Ford, 39 P.3d 1085 112 (Mont. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See
also cases, supra, at 4 and cases cited in Pet Br. at 14-15.
Finally, defendant argues that if rule 18's good cause time allowance does not apply
to a Batson objection, the imposition of any other time limit would constitute a "new rule"
which could not bar review in this case. See Resp. Br. at 15 & 17 (citing Ford v. Georgia,
498 U.S. 411 (1991)). The court of appeals agreed with defendant:
[0]nly "firmly established and regularly followed state [procedure] may be
interposed by a State to prevent subsequent [appellate] review" of this
important constitutional claim.
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, \ 7 (quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24) (brackets in original).
However, as discussed in Pet. Br.} Point I, requiring a Batson objection to be raised
during jury selection is not a "new" rule. In any event, Valdez misinterprets Ford. The
actual quote in Ford reads:
[The United States Supreme Court] held that only a firmly established and
regularly followed state practice may be interposed by a State to prevent
subsequent review by this Court of a federal constitutional issue.
Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Pursuant
to Ford, a federal court cannot review the merits of a federal constitutional issue when the
underlying state court refused to consider the merits based on an independent state rule which
was firmly established and regularly applied by the state court at the time of the defendant's
trial. See Brewer v. Marshal, 119F.3d993,1001-03 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining independent
grounds rule in context of Batson claim); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 427-29 (6th
Cir. 2001) (same).
7

The independent grounds rule, however, has no application to a state appellate court's
review of a state conviction. Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Resp. Br. at 15 & 17, this
Court regularly applies "new" procedural rules to the case on appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 53,992 P.2d 951 (recognizing that "[t]he long-standing traditional
rule is that the law established by a court decision applies both prospectively and
retrospectively, even when the decision overrules prior case law"); State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393,398-400 (Utah 1994) (overturning precedent and applying a new preservation rule
to Menzies on appeal). Moreover, Batson itself was retroactive. See Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 316 & 326-27 (1987) (holding that Batson or any case imposing a "new rule
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions . . . is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the
new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past").
REPLY TO POINTS II-IV OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
CONTRARY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS, THE ANALYSIS IN
VALDEZIS FLAWED AND ITS RESULT IS ERRONEOUS
As explained in the State's opening brief, see Pet. Br. at 25-39, Batson analysis has
three steps. In step one, the opponent of a peremptory strike (defendant) makes a prima facie
showing that the challenged strike was exercised with a discriminatory intent. In step two,
the proponent of the strike (the prosecutor) provides a non-discriminatory explanation for
the strike. In step three, the trial court resolves the issue by determining if defendant has
established that the strike was discriminatory. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.

8

This three step approach "facilitate^) the orderly consideration of relevant evidence"
through "a series of shifting evidentiary burdens that are intended progressively to sharpen
the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Watson v. Forth
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2418 n.7 (2005) (Addendum B).
The scheme's shifting burdens of production are u; meant only to aid courts and litigants in
arranging the presentation of evidence;" they do not shift the burden of persuasion which
"remains at all times'" with the party alleging discrimination. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986
(quoting Texas Dept. ofCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450U.S. 248,253 (1981)). Accord
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417.
The State previously argued that "Batson's three step analytical procedure is identical
to that found in employment discrimination cases." Pet Br. at 25 & 26-39. In June 2005,
the United States Supreme Court again confirmed that its Batson's analysis "comports with
our interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in cases arising under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Actof 1964." Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418n.7 (citing 5t Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1993); Watson, 487 U.S. at 986; Furnco Constr. Corp v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80204 (1973)). A comparison of Batson and Title VII cases over the last three decades confirms
their common analytical foundation. See, e.g.y Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418 n.7 (comparing
peremptory strike analysis with Title VII standard of McDonnell Douglas)', Purkett v. Elm,
514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (applying Title VII analysis of St. Mary's Honor Center, 509
9

U.S. at 502, and Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-58, to peremptory strikes); Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 & 364 (1991) (same citing United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983)); Batson, A16 U.S. at 85,89 & 94-98 (same citing
Aikens, Burdine, and McDonnell Douglas). See also St Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S.
at 506-11 & 515-19 (applying Aikins and McDonnell to evaluation of Title VII claim),
Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87 (same citing Aikins, Burdine, McDonnell Douglas), Aikens,
460 U.S. at 714-16 (same citing Burdine and McDonnell Douglas); Burdine, 450 U.S. at
252-56 (same citing McDonnell Douglas).
These authorities are uniform in their interpretation of step two of the discrimination
model, the step at issue in this case. Step two is purely a matter of production. See Johnson,
125 S.Ct at 2417. Accord St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 506-08 (citing Burdine,
450 U.S. at 254-55). The prosecutor has the burden of producing an explanation for his
strike beyond a mere denial of discriminatory intent or assertion of good faith. See Purkett,
514 U.S. at 769. But while the burden of production shifts from defendant in step one to the
prosecutor in step two, there is no shift in the burden of persuasion or "risk of
nonpersuasion," which remains at all times with defendant as the opponent of the strike. See
St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 507 (in context of Title VII) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Accord Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18. Consequently, whether the
prosecutor has met his burden in step two "'can involve no credibility assessment.'"
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418 n.7 (citing S£ Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 509-10 & n.3
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(quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 986)). If a facially neutral explanation is produced, the inquiry
proceeds to step three. See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18 & n.7.
Defendant disagrees. He argues that in Batson cases, step two is not necessarily
satisfied by the production of a facially non-discriminatory explanation. SeeResp. Br. at 2731. Citing court of appeals' decisions, defendant argues that the prosecutor's explanation
also must be "(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific,
and (4) legitimate." Resp. Br. at 31 (citing Valdez, 2004 UT App 214,121, and Cannon,
2002 UT App 18, Tf 9) (quotation marks omitted). Defendant contends that these factors are
not alternative descriptions of the otherwise facially valid explanation, but constitute separate
and mandatory requirements. See Resp. Br. at 31-32. See also Valdez, id. Valdez held and
defendant argues that without the imposition of these additional mandatory factors, even
"fanciful and spurious explanations" would satisfy step two and compel the trial court to
unnecessarily proceed with its step three analysis even though the "State had offered nothing
concrete by way of explanation." See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^ 30 (emphasis in original).
See also Resp. Br. at 29-31.
The Valdez approach contradicts established United States Supreme Court precedent.
See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-70. See also Pet. Br. at 31-34. Just last month, the Supreme
Court emphasized that:
Thus, even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical
justification for its strike, the case does not end—it merely proceeds to step
three.

11

Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18 (citations omitted). Thus, contrary to Valdez's holding,
fanciful and spurious explanations do satisfy step two, so long as those explanations are
facially neutral.
The Valdez holding miscomprehends the function of step two. Step one (the prima
facie showing) establishes facts, which if believed, could support a finding of discriminatory
intent. See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 506-07. Step two, on the other hand,
establishes a basis, which if believed, could support a finding of no discriminatory intent.
See id. at 507. As explained in Johnson, the trial court can address the merits of defendant's
challenge only after these two steps:
The first two Batson steps govern the production of evidence that allows the
trial court to determine the persuasiveness of the defendant's constitutional
claim. "It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification
becomes relevant—the step in which the trial court determines whether the
opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination."
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). By requiring both parties to
state their positions, the trial court's inquiry in step three become focused with sufficient
specificity to permit a ruling. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 & n.8.
Because the prosecutor, as the proponent of the strike, carries no burden of persuasion
and no "risk of nonpersuasion," the quality and believability of the explanation are irrelevant
in step two. See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 507. In step three, however, they
may provide persuasive "circumstantial evidence" that Ihe strike was or was not
discriminatory. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).

12

Consequently, even if a prosecutor supplies only a spurious explanation in step two, the
Batson inquiry does not end, but proceeds to step three. See Johnson, 125 S .Ct. at 2417-18.
Indeed, a prosecutor's utter failure to meet step two's burden of production does not negate
the necessity of proceeding to step three:
In the unlikely hypothetical in which the prosecutor declines to respond to a
trial judge's inquiry regarding his justification for making a strike, the
evidence before the judge would consist not only of the original facts from
which the prima facie case was established, but also the prosecutor's refusal
to justify his strike in light of the court's request. Such a refusal would
provided additional support for the inference of discrimination raised by a
defendant's prima facie case.
M a t 2417 n.6.
In this case, the prosecutor was not silent, but provided explanations for each of the
challenged strikes. See Pet, Br, at 32-39. Valdez acknowledged that "anyone would concede
[these explanations were] nondiscriminatory," but nevertheless concluded that they were
pretextual as a "matter of law" because they were not "reasonably clear and specific" and in
some instances, "were unrelated to the case at hand."6 2004 UT App 214, \ 28.

6

Valdez specifically adopted an abuse of discretion standard of review for steps
one and two, based on this Court's adoption of the same standard in State v. Alvarez, 872
P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). See 2004 UT App 214, Tffl 14-17. However, Valdez applied a
question of law standard in concluding the explanations were pretextual. See id. at \ 29.
In addition to the cases cited in Pet. Br, at 34 n.5, the following cases support that steps
one and two are questions of law. See Stevenson v. Tax Comm., 2005 UT App 179, ^f 11,
112, P.3d 1232 (reviewing prima facie case as a matter of law); State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d
454, 459 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 454 (Utah 1993) (same); Hidalgo v. Fagen,
206 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2000) (reviewing step two as a matter of law); United
States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (same).
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In reaching this conclusion, Valdez looked beyond the face of the explanations and
considered "the context of the case," which the court viewed as "indispensable" to step two
analysis. See 2004 UT App 214, \ 17. The court compared the prosecutor's explanations
with the voir dire responses of the stricken jurors and other members of the venire. See id
atffif26-28. It also compared the prosecutor's explanations to the issues of the case. See id.
Based on these comparisons—and not the facial validity of the explanations themselves—the
court rejected the prosecutor's explanations and ended its Batson inquiry. See id at ^ 29-30.
While defendant endorses this approach, see Resp. Br. at 27-37, the United States Supreme
Court has rejected it. See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2417-18; Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-69.
Defendant also argues that even if the court of appeals erred in its step two assessment
and improperly commingled step three's criteria with step two, the error is harmless. See
Resp. Br. at 3 7-45. According to defendant, any court reviewing the matter would reject the
prosecutor's explanations as pretextual and deny the strikes. See id. If proper Batson
standards were applied, this is not true.7
A trial court's finding regarding discriminatory intent (step three) is entitled to great
deference on appeal; only a finding of clear error justifies its reversal. See State v. Colwell,
2000 UT 8, % 20,994 P.2d 177. Though defendant disputes the validity of the explanations,

7

Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Resp. Br. at 45, in petitioning for certiorari,
the State raised this issue by arguing that the court of appeals erred in substituting its
assessment of credibility for that of the trial court. See Petition at 9-14 and Reply
Petition at 5. See also Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) (recognizing that all fairly included
subissues fall within a grant of certiorari review).
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see Resp. Br. at 33-45, he does not allege or establish that the trial court clearly erred in
finding no discriminatory intent.
Instead, defendant presumes that if the prosecutor's explanations are rejected, a
finding of discriminatory intent necessarily follows. See Resp. Br. at 43-44. The Supreme
Court rejected an identical argument in the context of a Title VII claim:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination
and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection,
no additional proof of discrimination is required
But the Court of Appeals'
holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment
for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle .. . that a presumption
does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that
the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.
St Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 511 (citing Aikens and Burdine) (other citations and
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, defendant has not met his burden of persuasion. As discussed in the State's
opening brief, once the prosecutor provides his explanations , defendant was obligated to
challenge any he claimed were pretextual. See Pet. Br. at 30. Here, defendant remained
silent (R209: 79-80). Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Resp. Br. at 21-22, defendant's
silence can and should be considered in evaluating whether he has carried his burden of
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persuasion.8 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citing Sfc Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at SOTOS).
Moreover, defendant's analysis of the jurors is skewed.

He argues that the

prosecutor's reasons for striking the four women jurors applied to other jurors as well. See
Resp. Br. at 33-45. While this is a factor which may be considered, it is not the only factor
in determining the ultimate question of discriminatory intent. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
363.
Moreover, the prosecutor was only asked to explain why he struck a particular juror.
He was not asked—nor was there any reason for him to explain given defendant's silence—
why he retained other jurors, who arguendo may have had similar characteristics with those
struck. For example, five members of the venire had relatives in law enforcement (R209:3031, 38-42). In contrast, none of the jurors struck by the prosecutor did (R206:14-16,18-19,
23-24,27-28, 34-35, 49-50). One member of the venire had a relative victimized by abuse
(R206:44). None ofthe jurors stricken by the prosecutor were (R206: 14-16, 18-19,23-24,
27-28, 34-35, 49-50). Five venire members volunteered in voir dire that they had military
or other firearm experience (R209: 25-27, 29-31, 38). None ofthe jurors struck by the
prosecutor volunteered that they had similar experience (R206:14-16,18-19,23-24,27-28,
34-35,49-50).

8

Defendant claims this issue is not within the scope ofthe certiorari grant. See
Resp. Br. at 21-23. However, the State argued in its petition that all portions ofthe
Valdez analysis were flawed. See Petition at 12-13. See also Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4).
16

Similarly, defendant ignores the pattern of the strikes. The prosecutor, however, did
not strike the first four women on the roster. See Addendum C (R. 94: Jury List). Instead,
he skipped over three women on the jury list before striking Valareio (id.). He also skipped
over four women before striking Gonzales (id.). In the next round, the prosecutor skipped
over two women before striking Thornton (id.). And in thefinalround, he skipped over four
women before striking Morley (id.).
These record facts may fairly be considered in determining whether defendant carried
his burden of persuasion to establish discrimination. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363.
In sum, when proper Batson standards are applied, the trial court's finding of no
discriminatory intent is entitled to affirmance.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this^? day of July, 2005.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner
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>
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Anthony James VALDEZ, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20030089-CA.
June 24, 2004.
Background:
Defendant was convicted in the
District Court, Third District,
Salt Lake
Department, Judith S. Atherton, J., of aggravated
burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, and criminal mischief. Defendant
appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,:
held that:
(1) defendant's alleged failure to timely present
Batson challenge did not prevent district court from
addressing challenge or result in waiver;
(2) defendant's objections to state's use of
peremptory challenges preserved Batson claim for
appeal, although he did not challenge validity of
prosecutor's explanations;
(3) Court of Appeals reviewed trial court's
determination for abuse of discretion; and
(4) prosecutor failed to articulate legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremptory
challenges to strike only women.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Jury <®^> 117
230kll7
Defendant's alleged failure to timely present Batson
challenge by failing to raise it until after the venire
had been dismissed, the jury had been sworn in, and
the court preliminarily instructed the jury did not
prevent district court from addressing challenge or
result in waiver; rather, court impliedly found good
cause to allow challenge to state's peremptory
strikes beyond usual limits by ignoring state's
timeliness argument and requiring the parties to
proceed directly to arguments on the merits.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc,
Rule 18(c)(2).
[2] Jury <§==> 117

230kll7
Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory strike
must be timely. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[3] Criminal Law <®^1028
110kl028
Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion
are deemed waived, precluding the appellate court
from considering their merits on appeal.
[4] Criminal Law <£^> 1035(5)
110kl035(5)
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson
depends entirely upon local procedures, but only
firmly established and regularly followed state
procedure may be interposed by a State to prevent
subsequent appellate review of the important
constitutional claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[5] Jury <®^> 117
230kll7
A district court may consider a defendant's Batson
challenge beyond the dismissal of the venire, even if
it has made no specific finding of good cause; so
long as it allows counsel to proceed with their
Batson arguments, the district court impliedly finds
good cause to consider the constitutional claim.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc,
Rule 18(c)(2).
[6] Criminal Law <@^> 1035(5)
110kl035(5)
Court of Appeals could not prevent appellate review
of defendant's Batson claim due to lack of timeliness
even if court agreed that Batson challenges were
prohibited after the venire has been dismissed and
the jury has been sworn, as proposed rule was not
firmly established and regularly followed state
procedure.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules
Crim.Proc, Rule 18(c)(2).
[7] Criminal Law <2^> 1035(5)
110kl035(5)
Defendant's objections to state's use of peremptory
challenges preserved Batson claim for appeal,
although he did not challenge the validity of the
prosecutor's explanations for the strikes. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[8] Criminal Law <®=>1030(1)
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110kl030(l)
To ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider an
issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah
requires that a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record.
[9] Criminal Law <®^=> 1043(1)
110kl043(l)
In Utah, there is no clear rule requiring a defendant
to renew a Batson objection or to object specifically
to the state's offered explanations; rather, Utah
courts do not require a party to continue to object
once a motion has been made, and the trial court has
rendered a decision on the issue. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14.
[10] Criminal Law <®=* 1152(2)
HOkl 152(2)
Court of Appeals considered defendant's Batson
challenge one of discretion with the trial court and
reviewed trial court's determination for abuse of that
discretion; issue of whether the prosecutor offered a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for peremptory
strikes was less like a factual issue, because the trial
court did not weigh evidence, but instead looked to
the face of the state's explanations.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[11] Jury<@^>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
The first step of the tripartite process for
determining whether the prosecution has engaged in
prohibited discrimination in the jury selection
process requires that a defendant challenging the
prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge present a
prima facie case of discrimination.
[12] Criminal Law <S^> 1152(2)
HOkl 152(2)
A trial court's determination that a defendant has
presented a prima facie case of discrimination in
jury selection is a matter of some discretion on the
part of the trial court, and will only be reversed if
the trial court has abused its discretion.
[13] Criminal Law <s^=> 1152(2)
HOkl 152(2)
The Court of Appeals allows the trial court
discretion in making the determination whether, in
the context of the specific case, a defendant has
presented a prima facie case of discrimination in

jury selection.
[14] Jury<@^33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
The third step of the tripartite process for
determining whether the prosecution engaged in
prohibited discrimination during the jury selection
process requires the trial court to weigh the evidence
and look beyond the explanation, if possible, to
determine whether the strike was purposefully
discriminatory.
[15] Criminal Law <@^> 1158(3)
llOkl158(3)
The trial court's actions in weighing the evidence
and looking beyond the explanation for a
peremptory strike during jury selection to determine
whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory
is intensely factual, and thus is reviewed for clear
error.
[16]Jury<@^33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a three-step
test to determine whether the prosecutor has
engaged in prohibited discrimination during the jury
selection process; this test equally applies in cases of
gender discrimination. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[17] Jury<®=»33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Under the second step of the three-step test to
determine whether, pursuant to
Batson, the
prosecutor has engaged in prohibited discrimination
during the jury selection process, even suspect
explanations must be deemed facially valid unless
they are inherently discriminatory.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[18] Jury <®=>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Although the Batson challenge step requiring the
prosecutor to give an explanation following a prima
facie case of discrimination does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible, it
does require the proponent of the peremptory
challenge to come forward with a neutral
explanation for the challenge.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[19] Jury <®=>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
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Under Bats on, the reason for a peremptory strike
must be related to the case being tried. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[20]Jury<®^33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Under Batson, the reason for a peremptory strike
must be clear and reasonably specific. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[21]Jury<£=*33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Under Batson, a prosecutor is required to articulate
a neutral explanation related to the particular case,
giving a clear, concise and reasonably specific
legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors;
there must also be support in the record for such an
explanation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[22]Jury<£=>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Prosecutor
failed
to
articulate
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremptory
challenges to strike only women; state did not
provide any basis for explanations that some jurors
were "overly compassionate" or "matter of fact,"
state cited vague nondiscriminatory motives without
tying motives to jurors themselves, and some of
state's explanations were unrelated to case at hand.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

the explanation will not be considered legitimate;
rather, the court reviewing a Batson challenge will
consider the explanation mere pretext as a matter of
law, unrelated as it is to the reality of the
proceedings before the district court. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
*294 John D. O'Connell Jr. and Lori Seppi, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Christine Soltis,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before BILLINGS,
JACKSON, JJ.

P.J.,

GREENWOOD

and

OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
**1 Anthony James Valdez appeals convictions for
aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-203
(2002); possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a second-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10503(2)(a) (2002); and criminal mischief, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
section 76-6-106 (2002). We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

[24]Jury®^33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a reason for
striking a juror, courts considering a Batson
challenge should apply particularly careful scrutiny,
because such after-the-fact rationalizations are
susceptible to abuse. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

**2 Valdez was prosecuted for various domestic
violence charges, including the violent crimes listed
above. On October 29, 2002, the district court
conducted voir dire to select a jury for Valdez's
trial. Following the jury selection, Valdez objected
to the State's use of its peremptory challenges under
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In order to demonstrate a
prima facie case of discrimination under Batson,
Valdez's counsel noted that the State used all four of
its peremptory challenges to exclude women from
the jury. Valdez further noted that in a domestic
violence jury trial, gender issues tend to be highly
charged.
Ultimately, he argued, the State's
exclusion of only women from the jury cannot be
disregarded, on its face, in the context of this case.

[25] Jury<8^=>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Unless the neutral explanation offered by the state
for a peremptory strike may, on its face, be tied to
the issues, evidence, and context of the case at hand,

**3 The State did not argue that Valdez had failed
to present a prima facie case of discrimination, but
instead argued Valdez's Batson challenge was
untimely. Without addressing the timeliness of
Valdez's challenge, the district court ordered the

[23]Jury<©^33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
In order to survive a Bats on challenge, it is not
enough for the prosecutor simply to describe a
nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to
something specific about the juror herself.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
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State to explain its challenges. The State explained
its challenges as follows:
[T]he State chose to strike Ms. Valerio because
she stated that she worked for a nonprofit brain
injury type of place. That is not a basis upon
which to strike her [for cause], but I felt her
responses lined up in a way that would make her
not a helpful [juror] for the State and that she
would be somewhat overly compassionate.
The second [juror] was Ms. Gonzalez. She had
heard of the case and seemed- though she said
that it wouldn't bother her, her responses to me
seemed matter of fact and I felt like her responses
would not make her a good juror for the State.
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case and I
don't recall what it was, there was something that
I immediately decided that I would make her one
of my strikes. She'd also been on a jury and he
was found guilty of a manslaughter, which I
thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least
that's the assumption. So again, I felt like she was
not going to be a helpful one for the State.
The last one I agonized over whether to strike,
No. 19, Paul[a] Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I
conferred with my colleague, ... *295 and we
talked about it and she brought to my attention he
was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would
know things about guns and brought that point
about that potential juror and another one. And
after conferring with her I changed my mind and
went with [her]—and that was simply—she was
simply towards the end. I suppose there was also
it felt like she was not strong, not—I'm sorry, I'm
trying to read my notes here....
There was this pattern of—her responses made me
think she would be somebody, again, that might be
willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would
say overly compassionate, and it was just based on
her responses about position, her responses to
little subtle things like her teaching piano lessons
and the magazines she chose. We don't have a lot
to base these things on, so that's how I made those
choices.
(First alteration in original.)
Ultimately, the
district court accepted the State's explanations and
overruled Valdez's objection.
**4 During the jury trial, the victim recanted her
accusation against Valdez. The State called an
expert in Battered Women Syndrom (BWS) to
explain why many victims of abuse recant their
accusation against their abuser. Valdez objected to

the testimony, but the district court overruled the
objection.
The jury found Valdez guilty of
aggravated burglary, possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person, and criminal
mischief. Valdez appeals.
ANALYSIS
**5 Valdez challenges the district court's ruling
that the State offered nondiscriminatory reasons for
its use of peremptory strikes.
I. Procedural Issues
**6 As a preliminary matter, the State raises two
threshold procedural issues that, according to the
State, bar appellate review of Valdez's challenges.
A. Timeliness
[1][2][3][4] **7 First, the State contends Valdez
did not raise his Batson challenge in a timely
manner. Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory
strike must be timely. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 99- 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1724-25, 90
L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (allowing for local timeliness
rules to bar Batson challenges); Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)
(stating, in context of Batson challenge, "[i]t is
axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue
on appeal, the record must clearly show that it was
timely presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon"). "Issues not
raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding this court from considering their
merits on appeal." Carlston, 116 P.2d at 655.
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson
depends entirely upon local procedures, see id.;
Fordv. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423, 111 S.Ct. 850,
857, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), but only " 'firmly
established and regularly followed state [procedure]'
may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent
[appellate] review" of this important constitutional
claim. Id. at 423-24, 111 S.Ct. at 857 (citation
omitted).
**8 Valdez waited to raise his Batson challenge
until after the venire had been dismissed, the jury
had been sworn in, and the court preliminarily
instructed the jury. The State refers us to several
other jurisdictions that require a Batson challenge to
be raised no later than "in the period between the
selection of the jurors and the administration of their
oaths." Id. at 422, 111 S.Ct. at 857; see also
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Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655-56 (citing favorably, in
dicta, several jurisdictions that require Batson
challenge to be raised prior to dismissing venire).
The reason for barring a Batson challenge after the
jury is sworn in has been variously stated as
follows:
The "timely objection" rule is designed to prevent
defendants from "sandbagging" the prosecution by
waiting until trial has concluded unsatisfactorily
before insisting on an explanation for jury strikes
that by then the prosecutor may largely have
forgotten. Furthermore, prosecutorial misconduct
is easily remedied prior to commencement of trial
simply by seating the wrongfully struck
venireperson. After trial, the only remedy is
setting aside the conviction.
*296 Id. at 656 (citations omitted); see also
People v. Holder, 153 Ill.App.3d 884, 106 111.Dec.
700, 506 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1987) (stating waiver
rule enforced "so as not to allow a defendant to
object to that which he has acquiesced in"
throughout trial).
**9 Furthermore, the State argues, this rule is
consistent with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
18(c)(2), which provides "[a] challenge to an
individual juror may be made only before the jury is
sworn ... except the court may, for good cause,
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but
before any of the evidence is presented." In State v.
Harrison, the Utah Supreme Court applied rule 18's
good cause provision to review an untimely Batson
challenge. See 805 P.2d 769, 776 (Utah 1991).
However, in that case the challenge was "made and
argued immediately after the jury was sworn in,
before the challenged jurors were excused from
service, and before opening statements of counsel."
Id. This is significant, the State maintains, because
once the venire and the challenged jurors have been
dismissed, the remedy of reinstating the wrongly
challenged juror is no longer available. Thus, under
the State's argument, Harrison represents the
"outside limit" in Utah to timely raising a Batson
challenge.
[5] **10 However, under Harrison, a district court
may consider a defendant's Batson challenge beyond
the dismissal of the venire, even if it has made no
specific finding of good cause pursuant to rule 18 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 805
P.2d at 776. So long as it "allow[s] counsel to
proceed with their [Batson ] arguments," the district

court impliedly finds good cause under rule 18 to
consider the constitutional claim. Id. In this case,
the district court did just that by ignoring the State's
timeliness argument and requiring the parties to
proceed directly to arguments on the merits. Thus,
the district court impliedly found good cause under
rule 18 to allow a challenge to the State's
peremptory strikes beyond the usual limits.
[6] **11 However, even if we adopted the State's
position, we could not "interpose[ ]" it "to prevent
subsequent [appellate] review" in this case. Ford,
498 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct. at 857. The rule the
State proposes, which would prohibit Batson
challenges after the venire has been dismissed and
the jury has been sworn, has not heretofore been a "
'firmly established and regularly followed state
[procedure].' " Id. at 423, 111 S.Ct. at 857 (1991)
(citations omitted). At best, this rule could be
gleaned by analogy and implication from Harrison
and rule 18. However, rule 18 itself allows Batson
challenges at a later time than the State's proposed
rule, because it allows challenges "before any of the
evidence is presented." Utah R.Crim. P. 18(c)(2).
Thus, in the absence of any firmer and more
established authority on the subject, we could not
prevent appellate review of Valdez's constitutional
claim due to lack of timeliness. [FN1]
FN1. This issue would best be addressed by an
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. This opinion should not be read as a
comment, positive or negative, on the
appropriateness of the rule the State proposes.
B. Preservation
[7][8] **12 Second, the State argues Valdez failed
to preserve his objection to the State's explanation
for the strikes.
Specifically, Valdez did not
challenge the validity of the prosecutor's
explanations for the strikes. Consequently, the State
argues, Valdez is precluded from attacking the
State's explanations for the first time on appeal.
"[T]o ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider
an issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah
requires 'that a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record.' " State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993)
(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)).
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[9] **13 We are persuaded by Valdez, however,
that his initial objection to the State's use of
peremptory challenges to strike women from the
jury constituted sufficient preservation of his
constitutional claim. Ford v. Georgia held that an
appellate court cannot prevent review by applying a
"rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial."
*297 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 858, 112
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). In Utah, there is no clear rule
requiring a defendant to renew a Batson objection or
to object specifically to the State's offered
explanations. Rather, Utah courts do "not require a
party to continue to object once a motion has been
made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on
the issue." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,H 14, 20
P.3d 265. Here, Valdez objected to the State's use
of peremptory challenges, thereby preventing any
claim that he strategically hid his objection until
after obtaining an unsatisfactory result, which seems
to be the State's strongest objection to Valdez's
challenge.
II. Issue and Standard of Review
[10] **14
Valdez specifically challenges the
district court's ruling that the State offered a
nondiscriminatory reason for its use of peremptory
strikes. We are unaware of any cases properly
applying an appropriate standard of review for such
challenges. State v. Chatwin appears to set forth a
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for such
challenges. See 2002 UT App 363,H 5, 58 P.3d 867
"Chatwin argues that the prosecution's stated
reason for striking the potential juror was not neutral
and constituted illegal discrimination.... Absent a
showing of clear error, we will not overturn a trial
court's determination concerning the discriminatory
intent embodied in a party's explanation for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge."
Id. To
establish the clearly erroneous standard of review in
the step two context, however, Chatwin cited,
without analysis, State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,
U 5, 41 P.3d 1153. That case set forth the clearly
erroneous standard of review in the step three
context, and is inapplicable here. Chatwin went
further, however, and decided the step two question
as a matter of law, rather than applying the clearly
erroneous standard it previously set forth. Here,
our decision will analyze and clarify the appropriate
standard of review for step two challenges.
Accordingly, we must determine the appropriate
standard of review, relying on analogy to other
standards of review applicable in cases involving

alleged discrimination in the voir dire process.
[11][12][13] **15 The challenge at issue involves
the second step of a tripartite process for
determining whether the prosecution has engaged in
prohibited discrimination in the jury selection
process. See Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363 at 1f 7, 58
P.3d 867. The first step of that test requires that a
defendant challenging the prosecutor's use of a
peremptory challenge must present a prima facie
case of discrimination. See id. A trial court's
determination that a defendant has presented a prima
facie case of discrimination is a matter of some
discretion on the part of the trial court, and we will
only reverse that determination where the trial court
has abused its discretion. See State v. Alvarez, 872
P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). The purpose for
allowing the trial court some discretion in
determining whether the defendant has presented a
prima facie case of discrimination was stated by the
Utah Supreme Court as follows:
The abuse of discretion standard of review is
particularly appropriate to this question.... [T]he
United States Supreme Court was reluctant to
define in detail what facts will raise an inference
of discrimination.
Likewise, we have not
articulated specific factors that amount to a "strong
likelihood" that minority jurors were challenged
because of their racial or ethnic group
membership. By according discretion to the trial
court in this area, we permit "experience to
accumulate at the lowest court level" until we "see
more clearly what factors are important to [the]
decision and how to take them into account."
See id. at 456 n. 3 (citations omitted). What may
constitute a prima facie showing of discrimination in
the context of one case may not constitute a showing
of discrimination in the context of another case.
This is so because each case may turn on different
issues, or even subtly different nuances. Thus, we
allow the trial court discretion in making the
determination whether, in the context of the specific
case, a defendant has presented a prima facie case of
discrimination.
[14][15] **16 The third step of the tripartite
process for determining whether the *298
prosecution engaged in prohibited discrimination
during the jury selection process requires the trial
court to weigh the evidence and "look beyond the
explanation, if possible, to determine whether the
strike was purposefully discriminatory." Chatwin,
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2002 UT App 363 at H 7, 58 P.3d 867. More than
being dependant on the particular issues,
circumstances and nuances of a particular case, this
determination requires the trial court to delve into a
weighing of the evidence and the credibility of the
prosecutor. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395
(1991). This is an intensely factual determination,
see State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,U 13, 41 P.3d
1153, and we thus review the trial court's factual
findings for clear error. See State v. Jensen, 2003
UT App 273,K 7, 76P.3dl88.
**17 In our view, the issue involved here, whether
the
prosecutor
offered
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory strikes,
is closely analogous to the step one issue. It seems
less like a factual issue because the trial court does
not weigh evidence, but instead looks to the face of
the State's explanations. See Chatwin, 2002 UT
App 363 at K 7, 58 P.3d 867 (stating prosecutor's
explanation "must be, at the very least, facially
neutral" (emphasis added)).
The trial court's
examination of the facial neutrality of the State's
explanation also considers the general context of the
case and the specific issues involved, see id. (stating
prosecutor's explanation "must be ... related to the
case being tried"), similar to the way the trial court
considers whether the defendant has presented a
prima facie case of discrimination. See Alvarez, 872
P.2d at 455-56.
Indeed, the district court's
consideration of the context of the case is an
indispensable portion of the step two analytic
framework, as we will discuss below. Thus, steps
one and two in the analytical process appear to be
analytic reciprocals. Accordingly, it is appropriate
to consider this issue one of discretion with the trial
court and to review the trial court's determination
for abuse of that discretion. [FN2]
FN2. Because Valdez's step two challenge
constitutes a sufficient basis to reverse, we do not
reach his alternate step three argument. Further,
we do not reach Valdez's arguments regarding the
admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome
evidence within the context of this case. See State
v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998)
(holding where one argument is dispositive of the
appeal, we need not address the defendant's
remaining arguments).

**18

III. Batson and its Progeny
Valdez claims the State engaged

in

impermissible gender discrimination during the
selection of the jury. In Batson v. Kentucky, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution governs the use of
peremptory challenges by prosecutors in criminal
trials. See 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90
L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States
Supreme Court stated that although a defendant has
"no right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in
part of persons of his own race,' " id. at 85, 106
S.Ct. at 1717 (citation omitted), a "defendant does
have the right to be tried by a jury whose members
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria."
Id. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. at 1717. In J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128
L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court extended the holding of Batson to protect
litigants from gender discrimination in the jury
selection process: "We have recognized that ...
litigants ... have an equal protection right to jury
selection procedures that are free from statesponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and
reflective of, historical prejudice.... We hold that
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality." Id. at 128-29,
114 S.Ct. at 1421.
The litigants are harmed by the risk that the
prejudice that motivated the discriminatory
selection of the jury will infect the entire
proceedings....
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges
in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and
reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities
of men and women. Because these stereotypes
have wreaked injustice in so many other spheres of
our country's public life, active discrimination by
litigants on the basis of gender during jury
selection "invites cynicism *299 respecting the
jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the
law." The potential for cynicism is particularly
acute in cases where gender-related issues are
prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual
harassment, or paternity. Discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges may create the impression
that the judicial system has acquiesced in
suppressing full participation by one gender or that
the "deck has been stacked" in favor of one side.
Id. at 140, 114 S.Ct. at 1427 (citations omitted).
[16] **19 Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a
three-step test to determine whether the prosecutor
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has engaged in prohibited discrimination during the
jury selection process. See State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d
517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying three-step test to
question of racial discrimination). This test equally
applies in cases of gender discrimination. See State
v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273,^ 13, 76 P.3d 188
(applying three-step test to question of gender
discrimination). We have stated the test as follows:
"[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge
has made out a prima facie case of [gender]
discrimination (step 1), the burden of production
shifts to the proponent of the strike to come
forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation (step
2). If a [gender]-neutral explanation is tendered,
the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful
[gender] discrimination."
Id. at K 13 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,f
17, 994 P.2d 177 (other citation omitted))
(alterations in original).
**20 In the State's brief, it concedes that it waived
the issue of whether Valdez presented a prima facie
case of discrimination. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^j
18, 994 P.2d 177 (stating prosecution must
challenge sufficiency of prima facie case before
providing rebuttal explanation for strike, or issue is
waived). Thus, we examine only step two of the
analysis.
[17][18] **21 Under this step, even "suspect"
explanations must be deemed "facially valid" unless
they are "inherently discriminatory."
State v.
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,1) 10, 41 P.3d 1153; see
also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360,
111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)
("Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed [gender] neutral."). Although this step
"does not demand an explanation that is persuasive,
or even plausible," Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,
767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834
(1995), it does " require[ ] the proponent of the
peremptory challenge, the prosecutor in this case, to
come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation
for the challenge." Colwell, 2000 UT 8 atH 17, 994
P.2d 177. Utah courts have enumerated a number
of factors that must be considered within the context
of the case at hand to determine whether the
prosecution has offered a legitimate explanation:
The second step [of the analysis] requires "the
prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral

explanation for the challenge." This step "does
not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible." So long as the reasons given are
" '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried,
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
legitimate,' " " 'the reason[s] offered will be
deemed race neutral.' "
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at K 9, 41 P.3d 1153
(citations omitted).
**22 The courts have been instructive in defining
and applying each of these factors. For example, in
Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., the Tenth Circuit was asked
to decide whether a defendant's explanation for a
peremptory strike was facially neutral. See 206
F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.2000). In that case, the
defendant struck a Hispanic woman from the venire,
explaining that it was because of her youth. See id.
The court, looking specifically at the facial validity
of the defendant's explanation, concluded the strike
was neutral, holding: "A neutral explanation means
an explanation based on something besides the race
of the juror.... Unless discriminatory intent is
inherent in the justification, the reason offered will
be deemed race neutral." Id. at 1019. Such a
rationale is similarly applied to show gender
neutrality.
*300 **23 The "legitimate" factor is closely
related to the "neutral" factor. As this court has
noted, the Supreme Court has provided guidance in
determining whether the reason for a peremptory
strike is legitimate: " 'a "legitimate reason" is not a
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not
deny equal protection.' " State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d
401, 404 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) (citation omitted).
For example, in Merrill, the defendant claimed that
the reason the prosecutor gave for his peremptory
challenge was not legitimate.
See id. The
prosecutor had dismissed a potential juror who was
Asian. See id. at 402. The reason for the dismissal,
the prosecutor explained, was because he feared the
potential juror would be biased against law
enforcement due to a recent speeding ticket. See id.
We concluded that was a legitimate explanation
because it "does not deny a potential juror equal
protection." Id. at404.
[19] **24 The reason for a peremptory strike must
also be related to the case being tried. In State v.
Cantu, a prosecutor's reason for a peremptory strike
of a Hispanic potential juror was invalidated in part
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because it was unrelated to the juror or the case.
See 778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989). . The
prosecutor's proffered reason for the strike was
because he was angry with defense counsel. See id.
The Utah Supreme Court held that this explanation
was desultory, and thus insufficient to fulfill the
Batson requirement that peremptory strikes must be
based upon grounds reasonably related to the case at
bar. See id.
[20][21] **25 Finally, the reason for a peremptory
strike must be clear and reasonably specific. This
factor prevents a prosecutor from merely denying
the existence of a discriminatory motive or by
generally proclaiming good faith, ensuring that
equal protection will not become a "vain and
illusory requirement." Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986). Rather, it requires the prosecutor "to
articulate a neutral explanation related to the
particular case, giving a clear, concise and
reasonably specific legitimate explanation for
excusing those jurors." New Mexico v. Aragon, 109
N.M. 197, 784 P.2d 16, 21 (1989). There must
also be support in the record for such an
explanation. See State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543,
547 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). For example, in Aragon,
the prosecutor struck two prospective jurors who
were black because they were possibly related to the
defendant. See 784 P.2d at 17. The New Mexico
Supreme Court noted that nothing in the record
showed the prosecutor had any basis for his opinion
that the potential jurors might be untrustworthy,
other than his own statement of their possible blood
relationship. See id. As a result, the court ruled
that "[t]he prosecutor's explanation was hardly 'a
clear, concise, and reasonably specific explanation
for excusing those jurors.' " Id. at 21 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
court. See id.
IV. Valdez's Batson Challenge
[22] [23] **26 With that analytical framework in
mind, we approach Valdez's step two challenge.
Valdez's argument that the State's peremptory
challenges violated equal protection is persuasive.
Specifically, Valdez argues that the State's reason
for using peremptory challenges to strike only
women was not reasonably clear or specific. As in
Aragon, there is little in the record to demonstrate
that the State had any basis for its strikes of these
four women. For example, as Valdez aptly notes,

the State explains that Jurors Morely and Valerio
were "overly compassionate" and Gonzalez was
"matter of fact" without providing any clear basis
for its opinions other than these cursory
descriptions.
Further, the prosecutor stated
variously "I felt her responses lined up in a way that
would make her not a helpful witness for the
State.... [H]er responses to me seemed matter of
fact and I felt like her responses would not make her
a good juror for the State.... I don't recall what it
was [about Ms. Thornton], there was something that
I immediately decided that I would make her one of
my strikes." These explanations all fall short of
being reasonably clear and specific. It is not enough
for the prosecutor simply to describe a
nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to
something specific about the juror herself. See
United States v. *301 Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546
(11th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutor's explanation
that he struck juror because "I just got a feeling
about him" "obviously [fell] short" of being
reasonably clear and specific).
[24] **27 If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a
reason for striking a juror, courts should apply
"particularly careful scrutiny" because "such afterthe-fact rationalizations are susceptible to abuse."
Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir.1992).
Although not required, prosecutors "would be well
advised ... to make contemporaneous notes as to the
specific behavior on the prospective juror's part that
renders such person unsuitable for service on a
particular case." Id. In this case, however, the State
was hardly clear, concise, or reasonably specific in
its explanations. It offered nothing more than vague
and generic descriptions of the jurors that anyone
would concede are nondiscriminatory, but which do
not appear to have anything to do with the jurors
themselves. This is not sufficient to satisfy our
equal protection jurisprudence, and is sufficient in
itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of the
State's peremptory strike.
**28 In addition to not being reasonably clear and
specific, some of the State's explanations were
unrelated to the case at hand. For example, the
State struck Thornton because she had been on a
jury that had found a defendant, who had been
charged with murder, guilty of manslaughter. As
Valdez correctly notes, other than being a criminal
offense, manslaughter has nothing to do with the
present case.
Valdez was not charged with
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manslaughter or any other lesser-included offenses.
Furthermore, Thornton's participation on a jury that
convicted another defendant of manslaughter does
not undermine her ability to be impartial in the
present case.
[25] **29 The State argues in its brief that these
explanations were not inherently discriminatory
because nothing in the explanations themselves
pointed directly to the sorts of invidious stereotypes
the law condemns. While this may be true, the test
for determining the legitimacy and facial neutrality
of an explanation in the Batson context is the list of
factors outlined in Cannon, see 2002 UT App 18,If
9, 41 P.3d 1153, and analyzed above. Unless the
neutral explanation offered by the State may, on its
face, be tied to the issues, evidence, and context of
the case at hand, the explanation will not be
considered legitimate. Rather, we will consider the
explanation mere pretext as a matter of law,
unrelated as it is to the reality of the proceedings
before the district court.
**30 Were we to hold otherwise, we would
sanction the use of fanciful and spurious
explanations for even the most sinister
discriminatory motives. Without the requirement
that the explanation at least have, on its face, a
grounding in the context of the case itself, racist or

sexist motives could more easily be masked by
unrelated
but
inherently
nondiscriminatory
explanations. In such a case, the district court
would have no need to proceed to step three to
plumb the depths of the prosecutor's motivations
because the State had offered nothing concrete by
way of explanation. See State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT
App 363,f 20, 58 P.3d 867 (holding State did not
offer legitimate step two explanation, obviating the
need to proceed to step three). This is just such a
case. The prosecutor's explanations had no clear
and specific basis in the case at hand. Thus, we
hold it was an abuse of the district court's discretion
to
determine
the
explanations
were
nondiscriminatory and to proceed to step three.
CONCLUSION
**31 The State's peremptory strikes should have
been invalidated by the trial court because the State
failed to offer facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanations. The explanations were neither clear
and specific nor related to the case being tried.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
**32 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Presiding Judge and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Judge.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of the United States
Jay Shawn JOHNSON, Petitioner,
v.
CALIFORNIA.
No. 04-6964.
Argued April 18, 2005.
Decided June 13, 2005.
Background: Following a jury trial, defendant was
convicted in the Superior Court, Contra Costa
County, Patricia K. Sepulveda, J., of second-degree
murder and assault on a white 19-month-old child,
resulting in death. Defendant appealed. The Court
of Appeal, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, reversed and
remanded. The California Supreme Court, 71 P.3d
270, Chin, J., granted the Attorney General's
petition for review and reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeal. Petition for writ of certiorari was
granted.
Holding:
The United States Supreme Court,
Justice Stevens, held that permissible inferences of
discrimination were sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under Batson, shifting
the burden to the state to explain adequately the
racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral
justifications for the strikes.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Breyer concurred and filed opinion.
Justice Thomas dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Jury <@^>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
State's requirement that in order to establish a prima
facie case under Bats on an objector must show that
it was "more likely than not" that the other party's
peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based
on impermissible group bias was an inappropriate
yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a
prima facie case of discrimination injury selection.
[2] Jury<®=>33(5.15)

230k33(5.15)
For purposes of evaluating peremptory strikes under
Bats on, first, the defendant must make out a prima
facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose, second, once the defendant has made out a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to
explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering
permissible raceneutral justifications for the strikes, and, third, if a
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court
must then decide whether the opponent of the strike
has proved purposeful racial discrimination.
[3] Jury<©^>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Inferences of discrimination stemming from
prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges to
strike all three African-Americans from jury panel
in murder prosecution of African-American
defendant charged with murdering his white
girlfriend's child, which caused the trial judge to
comment that the case was close and the state
Supreme Court to acknowledge that it was
suspicious that all three
African-American
prospective jurors were removed, were sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
Bats on, shifting the burden to the State to explain
adequately the racial exclusion by offering
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.
[4]Jury<§^>33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
To establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges at defendant's trial: first, the
defendant must show that he is a member of a
cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire members of the defendant's race; second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which
there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits those
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate;
finally, the defendant must show that these facts and
any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their
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race.
[5]Jury<@=^33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
A defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson" s
first step of making a prima facie case of
discrimination, thereby shifting the burden to the
state to explain adequately the racial exclusion by
offering permissible race-neutral justifications for
the strikes, by producing evidence sufficient to
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred.
[6] Jury<S^33(5.15)
230k33(5.15)
Under Batson analysis, in the unlikely hypothetical
in which the prosecutor declines to respond to a trial
judge's inquiry regarding his justification for making
a strike, the evidence before the judge to be
considered in making the
decision whether the defendant has proven
purposeful racial discrimination would consist not
only of the original facts from which the prima facie
case was established, but also the prosecutor's
refusal to justify his strike in light of the court's
request.
*2A12 Syllabus [FN*]
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed.
499.
Petitioner Johnson, a black man, was convicted in a
California state court of assaulting and murdering a
white child. During jury selection, a number of
prospective jurors were removed for cause until 43
eligible jurors remained, three of whom were black.
The prosecutor used 3 of his 12 peremptory
challenges to remove the prospective black jurors,
resulting in an all-white jury. Defense counsel
objected to those strikes on the ground that they
were unconstitutionally based on race. The trial
judge did not ask the prosecutor to explain his
strikes, but instead simply found that petitioner had
failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination under the governing state precedent,
People v. Wheeler, which required a showing of a
strong likelihood that the exercise of peremptory
challenges was based on group bias. The judge
explained that, although the case was close, his
review of the record convinced him that the

prosecutor's strikes could be justified by raceneutral reasons. The California Court of Appeal set
aside the conviction, but the State Supreme Court
reinstated it, stressing that Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, permits
state courts to establish the standards used to
evaluate the sufficiency of prima facie cases of
purposeful discrimination in jury selection.
Reviewing Batson, Wheeler, and their progeny, the
court concluded that Wheeler's "strong likelihood"
standard is entirely consistent with Batson. Under
Batson, the court held, a state court may require the
objector to present not merely enough evidence to
permit an inference that discrimination has occurred,
but sufficiently strong evidence to establish that the
challenges, if not explained, were more likely than
not based on race. Applying that standard, the court
acknowledged that the exclusion of all three black
prospective jurors looked suspicious, but deferred to
the trial judge's ruling.
Held: California's "more likely than not" standard
is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure
the sufficiency of a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in jury selection. This narrow but
important issue concerns the scope of the first of
three steps Batson enumerated:
(1) Once the
defendant has made out a prima facie case and (2)
the State has satisfied its burden to offer permissible
race-neutral justifications for the strikes, e.g., 476
U.S., at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712, then (3) the trial court
must decide whether the defendant has proved
purposeful racial discrimination, Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L,Ed.2d 834.
Batson does not permit California to require at step
one that the objector show that it is more likely than
not the other party's peremptory challenges, if
unexplained, were based on impermissible group
bias. The Batson Court held that a prima facie case
can be made out by offering a wide variety of
evidence, so long as the sum of the *2413 proffered
facts gives "rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose." 476 U.S., at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The
Court explained that to establish a prima facie case,
the defendant must show that his membership in a
cognizable racial group, the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges to remove members of that
group, the indisputable fact that such challenges
permit those inclined to discriminate to do so, and
any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor excluded venire members on
account of race. Id., at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The
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Court assumed that the trial judge would have the
benefit of all relevant circumstances, including the
prosecutor's explanation, before deciding whether it
was more likely than not that the peremptory
challenge was improperly motivated. The Court did
not intend the first step to be so onerous that a
defendant would have to persuade the judge-on the
basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible
for the defendant to know with certainty-that the
challenge was more likely than not the product of
purposeful discrimination.
Instead, a defendant
satisfies Batson's first step requirements by
producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has
occurred. The facts of this case illustrate that
California's standard is at odds with the prima facie
inquiry mandated by Batson.
The permissible
inferences of discrimination, which caused the trial
judge to comment that the case was close and the
California Supreme Court to acknowledge that it
was suspicious that all three black prospective jurors
were removed, were sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. Pp. 2418-2419.
Reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR,
SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and
BREYER, JJ., joined.
BREYER, J., filed a
concurring opinion.
THOMAS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
Stephen B. Bedrick, Oakland, CA, for Petitioner.
Seth K. Schalit,
Respondent.
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Stephen B. Bedrick, Oakland, CA, Eric Schnapper,
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Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the
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[1] The Supreme Court of California and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have
provided conflicting answers to the following
question: "Whether to establish a prima facie case
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct.
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the objector must
show that it is more likely than not that the other
party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were
based on impermissible group bias?" Pet. for Cert,
i. Because both of those courts regularly review the
validity of convictions obtained in California
criminal trials, respondent, the State of California,
agreed to petitioner's request that we grant certiorari
and resolve the conflict. We agree with the Ninth
Circuit that the question presented *2414 must be
answered in the negative, and accordingly reverse
the judgment of the California Supreme Court.
I
Petitioner Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was
convicted in a California trial court of second-degree
murder and assault on a white 19-month-old child,
resulting in death. During jury selection, a number
of prospective jurors were removed for cause until
43 eligible jurors remained, 3 of whom were black.
The prosecutor used 3 of his 12 peremptory
challenges to remove the black prospective jurors.
The resulting jury, including alternates, was all
white.
After the prosecutor exercised the second of his
three peremptory challenges against the prospective
black jurors, defense counsel objected on the ground
that the challenge was unconstitutionally based on
race under both the California and United States
Constitutions. People v. Johnson, 30 Cal.4th 1302,
1307, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, 272-273 (2003)
. [FN1] Defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor
"had no apparent reason to challenge this
prospective juror 'other than [her] racial identity.' "
Ibid, (alteration in original). The trial judge did not
ask the prosecutor to explain the rationale for his
strikes.
Instead, the judge simply found that
petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case
under the governing state precedent, People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583
P.2d 748 (1978), reasoning " 'that there's not been
shown a strong likelihood that the exercise of the
peremptory challenges were based upon a group
rather than an individual basis,' " 30 Cal.4th, at
1307, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 272 (emphasis
added).
The judge did, however, warn the
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prosecutor that " 'we are very close.' " People v.
Johnson, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 729 (2001).
FN1. Petitioner's state objection was made under
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr.
890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
Defense counsel made an additional motion the next
day when the prosecutor struck the final remaining
prospective black juror. 30 Cal.4th, at 1307, 1
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 272. Counsel argued
that the prosecutor's decision to challenge all of the
prospective black jurors constituted a "systematic
attempt to exclude African-Americans from the jury
panel." 105 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 729. The trial judge
still did not seek an explanation from the prosecutor.
Instead, he explained that his own examination of
the record had convinced him that the prosecutor's
strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons.
Specifically, the judge opined that the black venire
members had offered equivocal or confused answers
in their written questionnaires.
30 Cal.4th, at
1307-1308, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 272-273.
Despite the fact that " 'the Court would not grant
the challenges for cause, there were answers ... at
least on the questionnaires themselves [such] that the
Court felt that there was sufficient basis' " for the
strikes. Id., at 1308, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at
273 (brackets added). Therefore, even considering
that all of the prospective black jurors had been
stricken from the pool, the judge determined that
petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case.
The California Court of Appeal set aside the
conviction. People v. Johnson, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d
727 (2001). Over the dissent of one judge, the
majority ruled that the trial judge had erred by
requiring petitioner to establish a "strong likelihood"
that the peremptory strikes had been impermissibly
*2415 based on race. Instead, the trial judge should
have only required petitioner to proffer enough
evidence
to
support
an
"inference"
of
discrimination. [FN2]
The Court of Appeal's
holding relied on decisions of this Court, prior
California case law, and the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190 (2000). Applying
the proper "reasonable inference" standard, the
majority concluded that petitioner had produced
sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case.
FN2. In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeal

rejected the notion that a showing of a " 'strong
likelihood' " is equivalent to a " 'reasonable
inference.' " To conclude so would "be as novel a
proposition as the idea that 'clear and convincing
evidence' has always meant a 'preponderance of
the evidence.' " 105 Cal.Rptr.2d, at 733.
Respondent appealed, and the California Supreme
Court reinstated petitioner's conviction over the
dissent of two justices. The court stressed that
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), left to state courts the task of
establishing the standards used to evaluate the
sufficiency of defendants' prima facie cases. 30
Cal.4th, at 1314, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 277.
The court then reviewed Batson, Wheeler, and those
decisions' progeny, and concluded that "Wheeler's
terms 'strong likelihood' and 'reasonable inference'
state the same standard "-one that is entirely
consistent with Batson. 30 Cal.4th, at 1313, 1
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 277. A prima facie case
under Batson establishes a " 'legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption,' " it does not merely
constitute "enough evidence to permit the inference"
that discriminalion has occurred. 30 Cal.4th, at
1315, 1 Cal.Rp1r.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 278. Batson, the
court held, "permits a court to require the objector
to present, not merely 'some evidence' permitting
the inference, but 'strong evidence' that makes
discriminatory intent more likely than not if the
challenges are not explained." 30 Cal.4th, at 1316,
1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 278. The court opined
that while this burden is "not onerous," it remains
"substantial." Ibid., 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at
279.
Applying that standard, the court acknowledged
that the case involved the
"highly relevant"
circumstance that a black defendant was "charged
with killing 'his White girlfriend's child,' " and that
"it certainly looks suspicious that all three AfricanAmerican prospective jurors were removed from the
jury." Id., at 1326, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at
286. Yet petitioner's Batson showing, the court
held, consisted "primarily of the statistical disparity
of peremptory challenges between AfricanAmericans and others." 30 Cal.4th, at 1327, 1
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 287. Although those
statistics were indeed "troubling and, as the trial
court stated, the question was close," id., at 1328, 1
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 287, the court decided to
defer to the trial judge's "carefully considered
ruling." Ibid. [FN3]
We granted certiorari, but
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dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because
the judgment *2416 was not yet final. Johnson v.
California, 541 U.S. 428, 124 S.Ct. 1833, 158
L.Ed.2d 696 (2004) (per curiam). After the
California Court of Appeal decided the remaining
issues, we again granted certiorari. 543 U.S. — ,
125 S.Ct. 824, 160 L.Ed.2d 610 (2005).
FN3. In dissent, Justice Kennard argued that
" [requiring a defendant to persuade the trial court
of the prosecutor's discriminatory purpose at the
first Wheeler-Batson stage short-circuits the
process, and provides inadequate protection for the
defendant's right to a fair trial ... ." 30 Cal.4th, at
1333, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 291. The
proper standard for measuring a prima facie case
under Batson is whether the defendant has
identified actions by the prosecutor that, "if
unexplained, permit a reasonable inference of an
improper purpose or motive." 30 Cal.4th, at
1339, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 294. Trial
judges, Justice Kennard argued, should not
speculate when it is not "apparent that the [neutral]
explanation was the true reason for the challenge."
Id., at 1340, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 295.
II
[2] The issue in this case is narrow but important.
It concerns the scope of the first of three steps this
Court enumerated in Batson, which together guide
trial courts' constitutional review of peremptory
strikes. Those three Batson steps should by now be
familiar. First, the defendant must make out a
prima facie case "by showing that the totality of the
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose." 476 U.S., at 93-94, 106
S.Ct. 1712 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239-242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597
(1976)). [FN4] Second, once the defendant has
made out a prima facie case, the "burden shifts to
the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion"
by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for
the strikes. 476 U.S., at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see
also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92
S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). Third, "[i]f a
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court
must then decide ... whether the opponent of the
strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination."
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct.
1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam).
FN4. An "inference" is generally understood to be
a "conclusion reached by considering other facts
and deducing a logical consequence from them."

Black's Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed.1999).
[3] The question before us is whether Batson
permits California to require at step one that "the
objector must show that it is more likely than not the
other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained,
were based on impermissible group bias." 30
Cal.4th, at 1318, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at 280.
Although we recognize that States do have flexibility
in formulating appropriate procedures to comply
with Batson, we conclude that California's "more
likely than not" standard is an inappropriate
yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a
prima facie case.
[4] We begin with Batson itself, which on its own
terms provides no support for California's rule.
There, we held that a prima facie case of
discrimination can be made out by offering a wide
variety of evidence, [FN5] so long as the sum of the
proffered facts gives "rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose." 476 U.S., at 94, 106
S.Ct. 1712. We explained that
FN5. In Batson, we spoke of the methods by
which prima facie cases could be proved in
permissive terms. A defendant may satisfy his
prima facie burden, we said, "by relying solely on
the facts concerning [the selection of the venire] in
his case." 476 U.S., at 95, 106 S.Ct. 1712
(emphasis in original). We declined to require
proof of a pattern or practice because " ' [a] single
invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not
'immunized by the absence of such discrimination
in the making of other comparable decisions.' "
Ibid, (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266,
n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)).
"a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit
jury solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at
the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the
defendant first must show that he is a member of a
cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race.
Second, the defendant is *2417 entitled to rely on
the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who
are of a mind to discriminate.' Finally, the
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defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an mference that the
prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their
race " Id, at 96, 106 S Ct 1712 (citations
omitted) (quoting Avery v Georgia, 345 U S 559,
562, 73 S C t 891, 97 L Ed 1244(1953))
Indeed, Batson held that because the petitioner had
timely objected to the prosecutor's decision to strike
"all black persons on the venire," the trial court was
m error when it "flatly rejected the objection without
requirmg the prosecutor to give an explanation for
his action " 476 U S , at 100, 106 S Ct 1712 We
did not hold that the petitioner had proved
discrimination Rather, we remanded the case for
further proceedmgs because the trial court failed to
demand an explanation from the prosecutor--* e , to
proceed to Batson's second step-despite the fact that
the petitioner's evidence supported an inference of
discrimination Ibid
[5] Thus, in descnbmg the burden- shifting
framework, we assumed m Batson that the trial
judge would have the benefit of all relevant
circumstances,
including
the
prosecutor's
explanation, before deciding whether it was more
likely than not that the challenge was improperly
motivated We did not intend the first step to be so
onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the
judge-on the basis of all the facts, some of which
are impossible for the defendant to know with
certamty-that the challenge was more likely than
not the product of purposeful discrimination
Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of
Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient
to permit the trial judge to draw an mference that
discrimination has occurred
Respondent, however, focuses on Batson's ultimate
sentence "If the trial court decides that the facts
establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and
the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral
explanation for his action, our precedents require
that petitioner's conviction be reversed " Ibid For
this to be true, respondent contends, a Batson claim
must prove the ultimate facts by a preponderance of
the evidence in the prima facie case, otherwise, the
argument goes, a prosecutor's failure to respond to a
prima facie case would inexplicably entitle a
defendant to judgment as a matter of law on the
basis of nothing more than an inference that

discrimination may have occurred
Respondent 13 18

Brief

for

[6] Respondent's argument is misguided Batson,
of course, explicitly stated that the defendant
ultimately carries the "burden of persuasion" to "
'prove the existence of purposeful discrimination ' "
476 U S , at 93, 106 S Ct 1712 (quotmg Whitus v
Georgia, 385 U S 545, 550, 87 SCt 643, 17
L Ed 2d 599 (1967)) This burden of persuasion
"rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of
the strike " Purkett, 514 U S , at 768, 115 S Ct
1769
Thus, even if the State produces only a
frivolous or utierly nonsensical justification for its
strike, the case does not end-it merely proceeds to
step three Ibid [FN6] The first two Batson steps
govern the production of *2418 evidence that allows
the trial court to determine the persuasiveness of the
defendant's constitutional claim "It is not until the
third step that the persuasiveness of the justification
becomes relevant-the step in which the trial court
determines whether the opponent of the strike has
carried his burden of provmg
purposeful
discrimination ' Purkett, supra, at 768, 115 S Ct
1769 [FN7]
FN6 In the unlikely hypothetical in which the
prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge's
inquiry regarding his justification for making a
strike, the evidence before the judge would consist
not only of the original facts from which the prima
facie ca<e was established, but also the
prosecutor s refusal to justify his strike in light of
the court'< request Such a refusal would provide
additional support for the inference of
discrimination raised by a defendant s prima facie
case
Cf United States ex rel Vajtauer v
Commissioner of Immigration, 273 US 103, 111,
47 S Ct 302, 71 L Ed 560 (1927)
FN7 This explanation comports with our
interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in
cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 See, e g , Furnco Constr Corp v
Waters, 438 U S 567, 577, 98 S Ct 2943, 57
L Ed 2d 957 (1978) (noting that the McDonnell
Douglas Corp v Green, 411 U S 792, 93 S Ct
1817, 36 LEd2d 668 (1973), framework "is
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the
evidence m light of common experience as it bears
on the critical question of discrimination"), see
also St Mary s Honor Center v Hicks 509 U S
502, 509 510, and n 3, 113 SCt 2742, 125
L Ed 2d 407 (1993) (holding that determinations at
steps one and two of the McDonnell Douglas
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framework "can involve no credibility assessment"
because "the burden-of-production determination
necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment
stage," and that the burden-shifting framework
triggered by a defendant's prima face case is
essentially just "a means of 'arranging the
presentation of evidence' ") (quoting Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986, 108
S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988)).

process thus simultaneously serves the public
purposes Batson is designed to vindicate and
encourages "prompt rulings on objections to
peremptory challenges without substantial disruption
of the jury selection process." *2419 Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct. 1859,
114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (opinion of KENNEDY,
J.).

Batson's purposes further support our conclusion.
The constitutional interests Batson sought to
vindicate are not limited to the rights possessed by
the defendant on trial, see 476 U.S., at 87, 106
S.Ct. 1712, nor to those citizens who desire to
participate "in the administration of the law, as
jurors," Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880). Undoubtedly, the
overriding interest in eradicating discrimination
from our civic institutions suffers whenever an
individual is excluded from making a significant
contribution to governance on account of his race.
Yet the "harm from discriminatory jury selection
extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and
the excluded juror to touch the entire community.
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black
persons from juries undermine public confidence in
the fairness of our system of justice." Batson, 476
U.S., at 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see also Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed.
84 (1940) ("For racial discrimination to result in the
exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified
groups not only violates our Constitution and the
laws enacted under it but it is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government" (footnote omitted)).

The disagreements among the state-court judges
who reviewed the record in this case illustrate the
imprecision of relying on judicial speculation to
resolve plausible claims of discrimination. In this
case the inference of discrimination was sufficient to
invoke a comment by the trial judge "that 'we are
very close,' " and on review, the California
Supreme acknowledged that "it certainly looks
suspicious that all three
African-American
prospective jurors were removed from the jury." 30
Cal.4th, at 1307, 1326, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d, at
273, 286. Those inferences that discrimination may
have occurred were sufficient to establish a prima
facie case under Batson.

The Batson framework is designed to produce
actual answers to suspicions and inferences that
discrimination may have infected the jury selection
process. See 476 U.S., at 97-98, and n. 20, 106
S.Ct. 1712. The inherent uncertainty present in
inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against
engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when
a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple
question. See Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083,
1090 (C.A.9 2004) ("[I]t does not matter that the
prosecutor might have had good reasons ... [w]hat
matters is the real reason they were stricken"
(emphasis deleted)); Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d
707, 725 (C.A.3 2004) (speculation "does not aid
our inquiry into the reasons the prosecutor actually
harbored" for a peremptory strike). The three-step

I join the Court's opinion while maintaining here
the views I set forth in my concurring opinion in
Miller-El v. Dretke, ante,— U.S. — , 125 S.Ct.
2317, — L.Ed.2d — , 2005 WL 1383365 (2005).

The facts of this case well illustrate that
California's "more likely than not" standard is at
odds with the prima facie inquiry mandated by
Batson. The judgment of the California Supreme
Court is therefore reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered
Justice BREYER, concurring.

Justice THOMAS, dissenting.
The Court says that States "have flexibility in
formulating appropriate procedures to comply with
Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)]," ante, at 2416, but it then
tells California how to comply with "the prima facie
inquiry mandated by Batson," ante, at 2419. In
Batson itself, this Court disclaimed any intent to
instruct state courts on how to implement its
holding. 476 U.S., at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("We
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decline, however, to formulate particular procedures
to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection
to a prosecutor's challenges"); id., at 99- 100, n.
24, 106 S.Ct. 1712. According to Batson, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that prosecutors
select juries based on factors other than race-not
that litigants bear particular burdens of proof or
persuasion. Because Batson's
burden-shifting
approach is "a prophylactic framework" that polices
racially discriminatory jury selection rather than "an
independent constitutional command," Pennsylvania
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95
L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), States have "wide discretion,
subject to the minimum requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with
solutions to difficult problems of policy," Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145
L.Ed.2d 756 (2000); Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 438-439, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147
L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). California's procedure falls
comfortably within its broad discretion to craft its
own rules of criminal procedure, and I therefore
respectfully dissent.
125 S.Ct. 2410, 73 USLW 4460, 05 Cal. Daily Op.
Serv. 5024, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6903, 2005
Daily Journal D.A.R. 6906, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed.
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